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  Claiming that the implicit cost of deposit insurance is an alternative proxy for 
risk-taking behavior, we examine the effects of incentive-inducing ownership and 
entrenchment of the largest shareholders and discretionary behavior of the management 
on the risk of Thai financial institutions. Our empirical results suggest that, during 
1994-1996, the largest shareholders engage in low risk-taking activities when they hold 
large cash flow rights and have low deviation of cash flow from control rights. However, 
the risk is higher when the largest family shareholder enters the board and when 
Chairman-CEO can manipulate loan loss provisions. After the financial crisis, earnings 
management through discretion on loan loss provisions reduces risk. Overall, this study 
suggests that the problems underlying the implicit guarantee scheme are different 
between banks and finance companies, and between types of governance structure. 
JEL Classification: G13, G21, G32 
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  11.  Introduction 
Despite the attention on the causes of the 1997 financial crisis, there is no 
consensus explanation on the cause of the crisis. Models of Asian crisis are often 
debated and divided into different lines of research. However, this paper focuses on 
bank fundamentals regarding weak corporate governance and moral hazard problems in 
financial sector. The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether the incentives 
of families to hold equity ownership in regulated financial institutions beyond the 
prescribed levels stipulated by the laws are important to the viability of financial 
institutions. 
Banks and other financial institutions are of particular importance in real and 
financial sectors especially in bank-based emerging markets. Banking channel is 
important in helping bridge the gap between the collection and the use of resources. 
However, the loss of confidence in financial institutions can break this gap and damage 
all economic activities as simply evidenced by the 1997 financial crisis in Thailand. 
Thailand provides a unique opportunity to study the relation between risks and 
bank fundamentals. Most Thai financial firms had long been owned and run by families 
before the onset of the financial crisis in 1997 (Anuchitworawong et al., 2003). 
Although Thailand faced several financial crises in the past, the magnitude of the crisis 
was most severe and apparent in the 1997 crisis. Regardless of when the crises occurred, 
the most common practice that Thai government would do is to intervene in rescuing 
troubled institutions to protect depositors from losses, and reimburse the depositors 
partially even if there is no formal legislation on deposit insurance in Thailand. Under 
such implicit insurance scheme, the stakeholders of financial institutions may seriously 
encounter agency and moral hazard problems (Garcia, 1999). 
  2Deposit insurance was first modeled as a put option on bank assets by Merton 
(1977) who demonstrates that deposit insurance encourages banks to take excessive 
risks. Subsequent to his work, Ronn and Verma (1986) and Duan and Yu (1994) test and 
calculate insurance premiums. They find that financial institutions in their sample were 
heavily subsidized. Kaplan (2002) calculates risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums 
for 15 Thai banks during the pre-crisis period of 1992-1997 and finds that the cost of 
insuring the deposits was highest for banks that were later closed, intervened, or sold to 
foreign investors. From this evidence, this paper accounts for the implicit cost of deposit 
insurance as an alternative proxy for the risk of financial institutions. 
As risk-taking behaviors vary across specific characteristics of firms, we 
examine whether the risk taking behavior of financial institutions are related with bank 
fundamentals like ownership structure and discretionary behavior of the management. 
From the literature, very little is known about the relationship especially in the banking 
environment of emerging markets.   
The paper closest to our approach is Laeven (2002) who uses international 
cross-section data to examine the relation between bank risk and governance structure, 
and find that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take high risk. Our paper 
differs from Laeven (2002) and others in three important ways. First, we analyze 
financial institutions in a country to reduce the missing of information specific to its 
market structure. Second, we account for incentives, a potential for expropriation and 
internal corporate control. Lastly, we emphasize whether the discretionary behavior of 
managing accruals affects risk. 
In this study, Thai financial firms listed during the pre-crisis period of 
1994-1996 and the post-crisis period of 1998-2001 are used. Covering these two periods, 
  3we investigate changes in managerial behavior and corporate governance. It is important 
to note that the 1997 financial crisis caused at least three important changes in corporate 
governance context: 1) bank ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of the 
state and foreign investors (Anuchitworawong et al., 2003), 2) the Stock Exchange of 
Commission has enforced the code of best practice that focuses on transparency, 
accountability, and responsibility to cope with weak corporate governance, and 3) there 
were substantial increases in accruals - loan loss provision and allowance for doubtful 
accounts (Figure 1). The amount of accruals can be easily manipulated by the 
management of a firm because it is an account entry that depends largely on the 
management’s subjective estimates of future outcomes.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
  This study contributes to the literature by providing our understanding about 
the emerging market that incentives can be an effective mechanism that helps align the 
interests between large controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. The 
results suggest that, before crisis, when the largest shareholders hold large cash flow 
rights and have low degree of separation between control and cash flow rights, they tend 
to engage in low risk-taking activities, resulting in lower cost of deposit insurance. 
However, there is some evidence that the risk is intensified when the largest family 
shareholders participate in the board of directors, and when chief executive officer 
chairs the board and has high potential to manage earnings through discretion on loan 
loss provisions.   
  For the post-crisis period, we observe that the risks in financial institutions 
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non-family run institutions. Importantly, the managerial discretion on the use of 
accruals has negative impact on institutional risk. In addition, banks create lower cost of 
deposit insurance relative to finance companies in both periods. The evidence confirms 
that, due to the bank’s regulatory and cost advantages, the business opportunities of 
finance companies are concentrated in high-risk business areas. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
institutional background in Thailand. Section 3 summarizes theoretical background and 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents information on data and methodology used in the study. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Overview of institutional background 
    The history of Thai financial market development dates back to 1888 when the 
British-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank set up its first branch to facilitate foreign 
trade financing in Thailand. Foreign banks had enormous influence on banking business 
in Thai financial market during its early stage of development. For Thai banks, the first 
domestic bank was established in 1904. The bank was initially under the name of Book 
Club, presently known as the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB). From then on, Thai 
commercial banking business has expanded over time. There were 14 more domestic 
banks established during the 1930s and 1960s. Twelve of these banks were founded by 
families. Many of the founding families still had control of the banks’ daily operations 
until before the crisis (Anuchitworawong, 2004). 
  Equity ownership had been highly concentrated in the hands of large 
individual/family shareholders, although the laws put the upper limits of shareholdings 
for each person to be at the 5 percent and 10 percent for banks and finance companies 
  5respectively. One plausible explanation for high concentrated ownership is that large 
family shareholders may value the benefits from control, which provides them with an 
opportunity for wealth transfer for the benefit of the families’ business groups.   
Thailand’s banking industry was concentrated and characterized by an 
oligopolistic market structure. Bangkok Bank, the largest bank in the market, had a 
market share of 28 and 21 percent at the end of 1988 and 2001 respectively. The bulk of 
the commercial banking system assets were accounted for by five largest banks – 
privately owned Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, Siam 
Commercial Bank and government-owned Krung Thai Bank. Their combined market 
share amounted to more than 60 and 59 percent in 1988 and 2001.   
Thai domestic banks have long enjoyed a high degree of protection against 
foreign bank competition in two important ways. First, prior to the 1997 financial crisis, 
foreign shareholding had been limited at the 25 percent level. Second, there was also a 
moratorium on the granting of new banking license by the central Bank of Thailand. 
These protections are believed to cause slow progress in institutional development that 
subsequently drives crisis. In addition, such a moratorium or market access limitation 
give rise to an increasing number of finance companies that are less governed. 
Many finance companies were independent while some institutions were 
subsidiaries or affiliates of banks that were in turn owned by families. Finance 
companies have not been allowed to take direct deposits from the public, but they can 
fund their operations primarily through the issuance of large-denomination promissory 
notes, or through credits from commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
Based on the statistics of the Bank of Thailand, banks were the central players 
in Thai financial system. The ratio of total assets to GDP has been more than 100 
  6percent throughout the period of 1993-2001 for banks, while less than 40 percent for 
finance companies. Banks also play important role in absorbing more than 75 percent of 
total deposits during 1993-2001 while finance companies absorb less than 32 percent 
before the crisis and less than 10 percent after the 1997 financial crisis. Compared with 
the size of financial market, the size of the Thai stock market has been much smaller, 
except in 1993 when the boom of stock market made its size more comparable with that 
of the financial market. However, in the post-crisis period, we can observe an overall 
contraction of the size of stock market relative to GDP. 
    In retrospect, Thai financial system had ever experienced three important crises 
from the collapses of, for example: 1) large finance company named Raja Finance in 
1979 due to the use of substantial amount of money in manipulating its share price, 2) a 
number of finance companies in 1983 due to fraud and mismanagement, 3) the Asia 
Trust Bank’s over-lending to its affiliated firms in 1984 that subsequently resulted in 
high non-performing loans, and 4) 56 troubled finance companies and the bath 
devaluation in 1997. One of the reasons that could help explain such phenomena is the 
lack of sufficient supervisory structure on financial institutions, especially for the 1997 
financial crisis, after which the quest to achieve better corporate governance in all 
sectors and to provide greater investor confidence has become a hot issue worldwide. 
  To rehabilitate troubled institutions and restore solvency and financial stability, 
the Bank of Thailand set up the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) in 
1985. In fact, Thailand has no formal explicit deposit insurance scheme, but the FIDF 
may be considered as providing implicit guarantee and financial assistance to depositors 
and creditors of financial institutions.   
  During the financial crisis in 1997, the FIDF had to resort to a blanket 
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depositors of 56 closed finance companies by exchanging promissory notes of these 
institutions with three- to five-year notes of government owned financial institutions. 
Note that the depositors of failed institutions were reimbursed a portion of their deposits 
long before the establishment of the FIDF. 
3.  Theoretical background 
3.1 Deposit insurance and governance 
Many countries have developed deposit insurance as a precautionary measure, 
intending 1) to protect depositors against bank runs, and 2) to contribute to confidence 
in the financial system’s stability by reducing unpleasant macroeconomic consequences 
of bank failures, or by preventing contagious effects of panics during crises. 
  Deposit insurance has different regulations across countries, ranging from full 
to partial coverage and from explicit to implicit scheme. All have costs and benefits. 
Full coverage scheme helps eliminate bank run to preserve the stability of all financial 
institutions. However, such a scheme can create moral hazard problem that tempts the 
management of financial institutions to make unreasonable commitments, and at the 
same time makes depositors less careful, and discourage them from moving their funds 
to safer institutions. These arguments suggest that a poorly designed scheme may 
encourage risky behavior by both depositors and institutions, and this will not improve 
the stability of financial system. 
Based on cross-country data, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that 
explicit deposit insurance lowers banks’ interest expenses and makes interest payments 
less sensitive to bank liquidity. Therefore, such explicit insurance system weakens 
market discipline on banks. Garcia (1999) further argue that poorly designed deposit 
  8insurance scheme will cause agency problem in which bank managers or employees 
acting as an agent of shareholders pursue their own interests rather than those of the 
shareholders. In addition, by realizing that runs are unlikely under government 
guarantee, the bank owners and managers of the insured institutions may take on 
additional risk in their asset portfolios.   
  Subsequent to the development of option-pricing framework of Black and 
Scholes (1973), Merton (1977) was the first to model deposit insurance as a put option 
on the assets of the bank with a strike price equal to the face value of the deposits. 
Theoretically, the cost of deposit insurance depends on the volatility of bank assets, the 
leverage level, and the time horizon of the option. Applying the option valuation 
approach, Marcus and Shaked (1984) examine the overpricing of deposit insurance by 
looking at the pre-insurance value of bank assets and find evidence of substantial 
overpricing of insurance premiums. Ronn and Verma (1986) account for regulatory 
capital forbearance in their pricing model, and the post-insurance value of assets, 
allowing for the dependence of the value of guarantee on the future value of assets. 
  Later, Duan (1994) develops a maximum likelihood framework to estimate the 
value of deposit insurance. However, implementing the Duan method requires accurate 
and high frequency data on deposits. Duan and Yu (1994) apply the method of Duan 
(1994) to calculate insurance premiums for Taiwanese depository institutions. They find 
that these institutions were heavily subsidized by the deposit-insuring agency.   
  Using the sample of 15 Thai banks, Kaplan (2002) uses the method of Duan 
(1994) to estimate government subsidies. The author argues that the estimated value of 
government subsidy can serve as an early warning indicator of banking crisis in Thai 
financial system.   
  9Applying the barrier model of Boyle and Lee (1994) to measure deposit 
insurance premiums of Thai banks and finance firms during 1992-1996, Tirapat (2002) 
finds similar evidence that higher risk institutions have higher insurance premiums. 
However, the results from using the barrier model are quite similar to those derived 
from the traditional method of Marcus and Shaked (1984). 
  By arguing that the level of the safety net subsidy granted to the bank is a 
measure of the risk-taking of that bank, Laeven (2002) uses a large sample of banks in 
14 countries including Thailand to examine the relationship between the risk-taking 
behaviors of the banks and their corporate governance structure. The author suggests 
that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the greatest risk and those with 
dispersed ownership engage in a relatively low level of risk-taking. 
3.2 Ownership structure and risk 
Much of the focus in the governance literature is how managerial discretion can 
be brought under effective control through ownership and internal control (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988). The benefits of having large shareholders 
are at least theoretically clear. Large shareholders have strong incentives to monitor the 
management and ameliorate agency problems, as it is more likely that the gains on their 
investment from monitoring would be sufficient to cover the associated costs (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that large 
shareholders are not well diversified and have to bear excess risks due to wealth vested 
in firms. When large shareholders who hold large ownership stakes and have large 
non-diversifiable human capital invested in the firms are involved in the management, 
the extent to which they hold less diversified wealth will give them an added incentive 
to reduce the risk of their equity holdings and firm-specific human capital. 
  10Recent view of the role of large shareholders posits that, like managers, 
dominant or controlling shareholders who hold sufficient voting rights, and in many 
cases are involved in the firms’ management may use their influence and control power 
to pursue their own interests at the expense of small shareholders, leading an agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 
1999; Bukart and Panunzi, 2001). The conflict may take the form of the preference for 
on-the-job perks, shirking, making self-serving decisions in relation to dividend payout 
and investment policies that increase firm risk and reduce other shareholders’ wealth.   
However, the relative importance of this problem depends on their cash flow 
stakes in the firm. The greater their ownership stakes, the more dependent their utility or 
wealth is on corporate value. Therefore, if the controlling shareholders adopt 
sub-optimal strategies, the firms would perform poorly and subsequently affect the 
controlling shareholders’ wealth. 
A number of studies examine the relationship between bank risk and ownership. 
Their findings have varied considerably. Some argue that the relationship between the 
ownership of the managers or controlling shareholders and the risk of banks is 
sometimes positive, sometimes negative, sometimes U-shaped, and sometimes inverted 
U-shaped. For instance, Demsetz et al. (1997) study a sample of 350 bank holding 
companies and find that risk is positively related with insider ownership, but only at low 
franchise value banks. Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) find a U-shaped relation between 
risk and insider ownership, indicating that a positive relation may occur only at higher 
levels of insider ownership. Many studies of non-financial firms also provide a similar 
relation between risk and ownership structure. For example, May (1995) finds empirical 
evidence that CEOs of the firms consider personal risk, so when they have more of their 
  11personal wealth in firm equity, they will have more incentive to reduce firm risk. 
  As banking crises have not only shown that financial institutions often take 
excessive risks but also that risk taking differs across institutions, i.e. some banks 
engage in more risks while other institutions are more prudent and can survive the crisis, 
we expect that, in general with ownership as an incentive-inducing mechanism,   
H1: Greater ownership held by the largest controlling shareholders is associated with 
lower risk.   
In banking industry, the problems regarding risk-taking behavior should be 
more concerned when there is improper implementation of deposit insurance. Although 
deposit insurance scheme has several benefits as described in previous section, it creates 
the incentive for moral hazard, i.e. the motivation for excessive risk-taking activities 
because the costs of pursing riskier strategies are reduced under the scheme.   
In the family-run institutions in which families own business groups, there may 
be a larger possibility of inefficient transfer of resources from the institutions to the 
firms in the group (Shin and Park, 1999). Saunders et al. (1990) show that owner- 
controlled banks exhibit high risk-taking behavior than manager-controlled banks. From 
the ‘tunneling’ view of Johnson et al. (2000), it is also possible that minority 
shareholders are exploited by the controlling families through pyramids and cross- 
shareholdings. This argument may be applicable to the Thai context. Anuchitworawong 
et al. (2003) show that large family shareholders most often use indirect control 
mechanisms to gain control in Thai banks and finance companies before the crisis. 
Therefore, the reduction in cash flow rights through indirect control may induce the 
family shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders during the pre-crisis period. 
  12H2: Insider ownership by the largest controlling shareholders under implicit guarantee 
scheme in which there exist weak supervisory practices and lax regulations increases 
risk.  
Recent studies provide convincing evidence that, when the degree of deviation 
of cash flow from control rights that is used as a proxy for entrenchment is high in 
countries with lax minority protection, this will have significant negative effect on firm 
performance (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002). Bebchuk et al. (1999) 
theoretically suggest that the agency costs of controlling shareholders are increasing the 
larger the potential to extract private interests incompatible with other shareholders’ 
interests. Thus, the widespread use of pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures to 
separate cash flow from control rights constitutes an important measure of incentives 
and the likelihood of agency costs. Hence, we expect: 
H3: An increase in the degree of separation between cash flow and voting rights of the 
largest controlling shareholders increases risk.   
3.3 Internal control, earning management and risk 
Another reason that may help explain financial crisis in East Asian countries is 
the lack of transparency and accountability. The disclosure of true financial information 
is important to good governance because it provides outsiders with a basis to monitor 
their claims and exercise their rights on deposit and ownership. Under poorly designed 
governance system, the management of a firm is able to exercise much discretion in 
concealing poor performance or postponing a portion of unusually good current 
earnings to next period (DeAngelo, 1988; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Warfield et al., 1995).   
Earnings management comes with costs and benefits. Benefits include the 
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credible communication of favorable, private information about future prospects to 
external stakeholders (Beaver et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996). Studies of loan loss 
accruals in the banking industry show that stock returns are positively related to 
abnormal loan loss provisions (Beaver et al., 1989; Beaver and Engel, 1996).   
However, the costs are the potential misallocation of resources that arise from 
income smoothing. Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988) indicate that the 
management’s information advantage over investors and creditors is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for earnings management to occur. Overall, the earnings 
management benefits managers while it leaves investors at a disadvantage since the 
latter cannot detect and undo the manipulated accounting numbers due to information 
asymmetry, but simply accepts the investment based on the managed earnings.   
  Attempting to explain why management manages earnings, Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995) argue that concern about job security creates an incentive for the 
management to smooth earnings. During years of poor performance, it has incentive to 
smooth reported earnings by increasing current earnings at the expense of future 
earnings. But when future performance is expected to be poor, managers have incentive 
to shift current earnings into the future. This can be achieved by making accounting 
choices that reduce current discretionary accruals for possible use in the future. 
To the extent that the management benefits from manipulation, we should 
expect that the management equipped with superior information has incentive to tunnel 
more. For instance, managers may use discretionary accruals to alter reported 
performance to maximize earnings-based bonuses for personal benefits. Such practices 
will be detrimental to overall performance and firm risk, especially under market 
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H4: Financial institutions with board independence are less likely to manage earnings 
through discretionary accruals that create greater risk. 
4. Empirical design 
4.1 Sample description 
We examine empirical hypotheses using pooled, cross-sectional data for 
financial institutions listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in the pre-crisis 
period of 1994-1996 and the post-crisis period of 1998-2001. The separate time periods 
aim at comparing the effects in the pre- and post-crisis periods. This study includes only 
listed financial firms that are quoted in the banking section and finance and securities 
section except securities and leasing firms. Two principal sub-samples of 129 and 94 
firm years before and after the crisis respectively are available in this study. 
We have collected data on daily market capitalization, total liabilities, other 
related accounting information, and equity ownership of shareholders who hold more 
than 0.5 percent of total outstanding shares from the I-SIMS database developed by the 
SET. The data on internal corporate control is obtained from annual reports and 
disclosure statements (Form 56-1) that are filed to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) annually by all listed firms.   
Further, this study is based on a newly constructed and comprehensive 
ownership database and different sources of information about family relationship. The 
sources include Phipatseritham (1981), Phipatseritham and Yoshihara (1983), Suehiro 
(1989), Chulpongsatorn (2000), and Sapphaibun (2001a and 2001b). Importantly, the 
information on all registered firms used in tracing ownership of private firms at the 
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(BOL) that has been granted the right by the Ministry of Commerce. Using this 
information allows us to trace for ultimate ownership of each financial institution.   
4.2 Methodologies 
4.2.1 Implicit cost of deposit insurance 
    In this section, we describe the Merton (1977) deposit insurance pricing model, 
which is implemented by Ronn and Verma (1986). The model is derived based on the 
option-pricing framework developed by Black and Scholes (1973). The concept is to 
interpret deposit insurance as a security that a bank holds and that yields same payoff 
structure as a put option. 
    To apply the option-pricing model to a financial institution, several 
assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that the bank’s debts are equal to its deposits, 
D, and that all deposits including their interest are insured. Next, it is assumed that the 
time, T, until the maturity of the deposits is equal to the time until the next annual audit 
of the bank. In this context, we assume T to be one year. This is reasonable since the 
Bank of Thailand makes an on-site inspection annually. Lastly, it is assumed that the 
bank’s asset values follow geometric Brownian motion with drift  µ  and  volatility σ : 
   t t dW dt V d σ µ + = ln  (1) 
where V is the value of assets, W indicates a standard Wiener process. 
  Given the above assumptions, the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing 
model is used to value the price of deposit insurance per unit of deposits, p, which can 
be written as follows: 
  ) ( ) / ) 1 (( ) ( t t t y D V y T p − Φ − − − Φ = δ σ  (2) 
  16where  ) /( )) )( 2 / ( ] / ) 1 [( (ln 2 T T D V y t t σ σ δ + − = ,  Φ  is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function, and  δ   is the dividend per dollar of the value of assets. 
    In order to implement the model, we follow Ronn and Verma (1986) to 
estimate two unobservable variables in equation (2), i.e. the bank’s asset value, V, and 
the volatility, σ . The equity value of the bank, E, which is directly observable, is 
viewed asa fully dividend-protected call option on the bank’s assets with a strike price 
equal to the value of its debt as follows. 
  ) ( ) ( T h D h V E t t t t σ − Φ − Φ =  (3) 
where  ) /( )) )( 2 / ( ] / [ (ln 2 T T D V h t t σ σ + = .  σ  can be solved by applying Ito’s 
Lemma to equation (3). 
 







σ  (4) 
where  E σ   is the annualized standard deviation of equity returns. 
  With observable market capitalization and equity volatility, we can 
simultaneously estimate these two non-linear equations to obtain V and  σ , which will 
be used in deriving the implicit cost of deposit insurance in equation (2). Note that we 
acknowledge the deficiency of imposing constant equity volatility. Nevertheless, to 
implicit the Duan’s method where estimates are consistent, we need audited 
high-frequency data on deposits that is not generally available. 
4.2.2 Discretionary portion of loan loss provision 
  This section explains how to model discretionary and non-discretionary 
behavior. Following McNichols and Wilson (1988) who model provisions for bad debts 
for non-financial sectors, this paper applies their methodology to model loan loss 
  17provision in financial sector. We emphasize on loan loss provision rather than a 
collection of accruals as often used to study earning management in non-financial 
sectors. Loan loss provisions (LLP) are important because they are highly judgmental 
based on the management’s decisions. They also reflect both past loss experiences and 
the impact of recent events and current conditions on the possible credit losses at the 
end of an accounting year.   
  Previous literature (Jones, 1988; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; to name a few) 
suggests partitioning an accounting accrual into two components – discretionary and 
non-discretionary. The model in this study is based on a balance sheet perspective by 
using beginning-of-the-year net loans (BLOAN), beginning-of-the-year allowance for 
doubtful account (BALLOWANCE), current period’s write-offs (WRITEOFF), and 
management’s expectation of future write-offs (NPWRITEOFF) that control for non- 
discretionary component of loan loss provisions. Since it would be difficult to model 
management’s expectation, I use next period’s write-offs as a perfect foresight for 
management’s expectation of future write-offs. The model is expressed as follows.   
 
it it
it it it it
NPWRITEOFF
WRITEOFF BALLOWANCE BLOAN LLP
ε α
α α α α
+ +
+ + + =
4
3 2 1 0  (5) 
where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets of firm i to mitigate 
potential estimation problems from heteroscedasticity. Discretionary components are the 
residuals from regressing equation 5. 
    It is expected that loan loss provisions are increasing in current and future 
write-offs since their informativeness may influence the expectation of the collectibility 
of current loans. We would also expect that loan portfolio in previous period is most 
likely to result in a higher provision in current period, although loan portfolios are less 
  18likely to reflect default risk exposure, compared with non-performing loans. 
    To regress the model, I use pooled cross-sectional data in our regression for the 
sub-periods of 1994-1996 and 1998-2001. I acknowledge main drawback of assuming 
constancy of coefficients across institutions and within the sub-period. However, a 
pooled regression has distinct advantage of not forcing the amount of discretionary 
behavior to be zero in any given year across banks. This is intuitively important because 
discretionary behavior could persist for longer than one period. 
4.2.3 Ownership concentration as a mechanism 
In this study, we use cash flow rights held by the largest shareholders 
(CFRIGHT) and the ratio of cash flow to control rights (ALIGNMENT) are used as a 
proxy for their incentives in monitoring and controlling financial institutions. We collect 
each year’s ownership structure as of December, or the closest date. Note that the 
shareholdings of individuals related through blood or marriage are aggregated and 
reported as a single unit. 
Cash flow rights (CFRIGHT) are the aggregation of direct ownership and the 
sump of the products of all ownership stakes along all chains of control. Control rights 
(CRIGHT) are the sum of direct ownership and indirect ownership that is computed as 
the sum of the weakest links along the chain of voting rights. Both measures are 
computed based on the approach used in Claessens et al. (2000), and Anuchitworawong 
et al. (2003) in particular for Thai financial institutions. In tracing for ultimate 
ownership, controlling shareholder is defined as a shareholder who directly and 
indirectly owns more than 25 percent of the firm’s voting rights in aggregate. 
4.2.4 Explaining implicit cost of deposit insurance 
    Next, we investigate whether governance variables (ownership concentration as 
  19an incentive-inducing mechanism and board independence) and discretionary behavior 
are related with the risk of financial institutions measured by the cost of deposit 
insurance. Generally, we include loan growth to control for risk taking in terms of 
excess credit growth, natural logarithm of assets for firm size, and non-interest expense 
ratio for management risk. Table 1 gives summary definitions of variables used in this 
study. The general form of the regression specification we estimate is: 
) var
, , , (
iables other
LLP ary Discretion ce Independen Board Ownership f RISK =
 (6) 
Specifically, we test various forms of the regression by using ordinary least square 
regression method for pooled cross-sectional data for each sample period.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on a set of selected variables. Banks and 
finance firms on average experience higher ratio of loan loss provisions to beginning-of- 
the-year total assets (LLP) after the 1997 crisis. The mean (median) of LLP increases 
from 0.4% (0.3%) in the pre-crisis period to 4.5% (2.9%) in the post-crisis period. The 
write-off (WRITEOFF) and expected write-off (NPWRITEOFF) ratios also rise after 
the crisis. Such increases may be partly due to the notification of the Bank of Thailand 
that requires financial institutions to write off doubtful debts, which have been 100% 
provisioned and appear to be unrecoverable. Besides, there may be due to tax purposes.   
Furthermore, loan growth declines after the crisis. This is as expected since 
after the crisis, lending within Thailand has significant dropped while the decline was 
  20due primarily to the increased write-offs of bad debts. All financial institutions were 
forced by the authority to solve the problem of non-performing loans that stay 
extremely high after the crisis. Therefore, they were more reluctant to extend loans as 
they attempted to protect the quality of assets and to maintain sound balance sheets. 
Next, we observe that equity ratio moves around 8-10 percent. Although the measure is 
underestimating the correct capital-risk asset ratio, the reported ratio is quite close to the 
minimum capital requirement of 8.5% for banks and 8% for finance firms. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
  Table 2 further convinces us that the financial institutions are relatively focused 
in terms of revenue sources (FOCUSREV), but diversified in terms of loan portfolios 
(FOCUSLOAN). However, the FOCUSLOAN index for the pre-crisis period is not 
reported because information on loan portfolios was not available prior to the crisis. 
5.2 Estimated implicit cost of deposit insurance 
  Based on the method of determining the cost of deposit insurance outlined in 
Section 4, we use numerical routines and come with results summarized in Table 3. 
Overall, the implicit costs of deposit insurance of finance companies are higher than 
those of banks over the period. Over the period of 1994-1996, average implicit costs 
stand at around 0.053 percent of total liabilities for finance companies, but only at 
0.0078 percent for banks. After the crisis, the implicit costs on average increase higher 
to 0.493 percent for banks and to 2.147 percent for finance companies. 
  Panels B and C further show the estimated costs of deposit insurance by 
categorizing sample firms into problem and sustainable financial institutions. Problem 
  21institutions are banks and finance companies that were closed, recapitalized by the 
government or merged into state-owned institutions during 1997-1999. Sustainable 
institutions include all institutions that are not problem institutions and survive after the 
crisis. Note that the estimated costs of deposit insurance for problem institutions are not 
reported for the 1998-2001 period for two reasons: 1) their shares were not actively 
traded in the market, so this limitation obstructs us from computing appropriate market 
value of assets and consequently the cost of deposit insurance, 2) finance and securities 
firms that were suspended in 1997 were closed, and delisted from the market.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Overall, the estimated costs of deposit insurance are higher in problem 
financial institutions than in non-problem institutions. For instance, the median cost of 
deposit insurance is approximately at 0.034 percent for the group of problem institutions, 
but is relatively lower at 0.0082 percent for non-problem group.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
It should be noted that the implicit costs after the crisis are in general higher 
than those before the crisis. Merton (1977) shows that an increase in the deposit-to-asset 
value ratio, or an increase in asset return variability leads to a positive change in the cost 
of government subsidies. Table 4 confirms Merton’s work. Specifically, Panel C 
presents that the ratios of total bank debts to market value of assets are on average 
higher in the post-crisis period. In addition, asset return volatility on average increases 
from 8 percent before the crisis to 11.3 percent after the crisis. Therefore, this may 
  22partially help explain why the cost of deposit insurance after financial crisis is higher.   
5.3 Ownership and control 
This section proceeds to identify the controlling shareholders of Thai financial 
institutions before and after the crisis, the level of ownership concentration, and the 
divergence from one-share-one-vote rule. To begin with, we first look at the distribution 
Thai financial institutions by types of the largest shareholders in Table 5. Over the 
pre-crisis period, more than 64 percent of all institutions have families as the largest 
shareholders, followed by the government, CPB and then foreign investors.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
However, after the crisis, the structure was changed importantly. Strikingly, 
most family groups lost their ownership and control over banks and finance companies 
after the crisis.
1  What happened after the crisis is that government and foreign investors 
have come to play important roles in more than half of all sample institutions. This was 
partly due to capital support schemes provided by the government to expedite the 
recapitalization of problem institutions, and the relaxation of foreign shareholding limit 
that induces higher level of participation by international investors. 
Table 6 shows ownership concentration in terms of control and cash flow rights. 
                                                  
1  In 1997, 56 finance companies were closed. In 1998, 12 finance companies and 4 commercial 
banks namely the Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC), the Union Bank of Bangkok (UB), the 
First Bangkok City Bank (FBCB) and the Laem Thong Bank (LTB) were ordered to write down 
and recapitalize. The BBC was transformed into an asset management company. The remaining 
three intervened banks were merged with other state-owned banks. 
  23Panels A and B indicate that ownership and control appear to be more concentrated after 
the 1997 financial crisis. In both periods, we can observe that ownership is highly 
concentrated in the hands of the government and foreign investors. The government on 
average held control and cash flow rights of more than 69 percent as the foreign 
investors increased their stakes to around 56-66 percent during 1999-2001. The mean 
and median differences of control and cash flow rights between pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better.   
Collectively, the statistics reported in Panels A and B of Table 6 shows that 
cash flow rights (control rights) held by the largest shareholders on average increase 
largely from the level below 25 percent (31 percent) before 1997 to the level higher than 
44 percent (49 percent) after the crisis. The roles of families as the largest shareholders 
in banking and financial sectors become less prevalent, when compared with the roles of 
the government and foreign investors.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
This evidence is consistent with Anuchitworawong et al. (2003) who study the 
ownership structure of Thai financial institutions for the five-year period of 1996-2000. 
Their study shows that cash flow rights (control rights) rise largely from 22.14 percent 
(29.85 percent) in 1996 to 41.28 percent (45.04 percent) in 2000. Their sample includes 
banks, finance and securities, securities, and leasing/factoring firms. However, our study 
excludes securities and leasing/factoring firms that do not accept public deposits.   
In Panel C of Table 6, we present the degree of deviation from one-share-one- 
vote rule. To the extent that the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights 
  24is associated with expropriation, we find that the largest ultimate shareholders on 
average may be more likely to extract private benefits of control in the pre-crisis period 
than in the post-crisis period. The ratio of cash flow to control rights suggests that the 
shareholders were less likely to use indirect shareholdings such pyramids and 
cross-shareholdings after the crisis, reflecting a more transparent control. 
High discrepancy between control and cash flow rights may give large 
shareholder more incentive to pursue private benefits at the expense of other small 
shareholders. Johnson et al. (2000) present the ‘tunneling”  view by arguing that a 
controlling shareholder with an opportunity to transfer financial wealth from one firm to 
other firms owned and controlled by the controlling shareholder would require large 
control stakes with small cash flow rights. In sum, control benefits from having large 
control rights create a wedge of the controlling shareholding between his power and his 
incentives to expropriate other shareholders. 
Compared with the average ratio of cash flow to control rights of 0.93 in 
Khanthavit et al. (2003) who use the sample of Thai non-financial institutions, our result 
is relatively lower at 0.73 for the pre-crisis period.
2 This suggests that the largest 
shareholders in financial sectors often use indirect means of control. One main reason 
that leads to the use of indirect ownership method is that the laws limit the maximum 
percentage of shares that can be owned by a person, as described in previous section. 
Thus, such restriction makes a shareholder to use control leverage that help to detain 
control over a number of firms that collectively hold sufficient votes in an institution 
without breaking the laws. In so doing, this shareholder invests less, but can possess 
                                                  
2  The result is comparatively similar with Claessens et al. (2000) who report the average ratio at 
0.75 for financial and non-financial firms in nine East Asian countries. 
  25control power and enjoy the benefit of control at lower cost. 
5.4 Loan loss provisions and their discretionary components 
    In this section, the discretionary components of an accrual item i.e. loan loss 
provisions. In so doing, we run regression on the equation 5 by using the samples for 
pre- and post-crisis periods. There are three points from the results in Table 7 that 
should be noted: 1) there is significant influence of future write-offs on loan loss 
provision, 2) the coefficient on beginning balance of net loans is statistically positive, 
indicating that loans granted in previous period also influence the decision of provisions 
for loan losses, 3) there is no any significant effect of allowance for doubtful account on 
loan losses. Additionally, specification test for the equality of coefficients for the two 
sub-periods confirms that the coefficients in the two periods are significantly different 
from each other at the conventional level of significance (F-statistic=11.87).   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
    Next, the descriptive statistics of the absolute value of discretionary 
components of (LLP), which are the residuals estimated from the regression model for 
each period are also reported in the table. The absolute values are used as a proxy for 
the combined effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing managerial 
accounting discretion, i.e. to serve to measure the extent to which managers pursue 
certain techniques to adjust reported earnings. Table 7 shows that the absolute value of 
discretionary LLP is on average low at 0.16 percent during 1994-1996. The absolute 
value of discretionary LLP is almost 20 times higher during the post-crisis period of 
1998-2001, revealing that the management of financial institutions exercises more to 
  26manipulate the loan loss provisions in order to manage earnings. 
5.5 Explaining implicit cost of deposit insurance 
  We next explore the impacts of ownership concentration in the hands of the 
largest shareholders as a corporate governance mechanism, managerial discretion, and 
the focus of the financial institutions on institutional risk. Table 8 report regression 
results for pre- and post-crisis periods.   
For the pre-crisis sample, the costs of deposit insurance are low for banks and 
finance companies where the largest shareholders hold substantial cash flow rights, 
consistent with hypothesis 1. The main effect of cash flow rights in model 1 indicates 
that a percentage change in cash flow rights reduces the cost by approximately 0.0099 
basis points. To account for varying effect of ownership, we test non-linear relationship 
between risk and ownership through piecewise specification by categorizing cash flow 
rights into 3 groups – 0-25%, 25-50%, and 50-100%. However, the coefficients for 
these three variables are not significant at conventional level.   
To go further, we examine whether the effect of an incentive-inducing 
mechanism is different between institutions where the largest family shareholders are 
present in the board of directors and institutions where they are not. Models 2 and 3 
suggest that there exists interaction effect, i.e. when a family enters the board, its risk 
becomes higher. This suggests that implicit guarantee may create moral hazard problem 
in the family-owned institutions, meaning that family groups may act imprudently and 
pursue higher risk-taking behaviors. This is consistent with hypothesis 2. 
Alternatively, we examine how reduced incentives due to the deviations from 
one-share-one-vote influence risk. The coefficient of ALIGNMENT in model 4 shows 
that as the degree of the separation of cash flow from control rights gets smaller, the 
  27cost of deposit insurance becomes smaller, supporting hypothesis 3. In addition, we are 
interested in whether the effect of this proxy for entrenchment on institutional risks is 
different between financial institutions with the largest individual shareholders on the 
board of directors and the institutions without the largest individual shareholders on the 
board. Models 5 and 6 suggest that the largest shareholders from family groups may not 
act effectively in controlling risk, probably because financial institutions perceive that 
they can obtain financial assistance from the government in times of trouble. 
  Next, financial institutions where the positions of the board chairman and the 
chief executive officer (CEO) are held by the same person experience different risk 
exposures. The overall results show that the cost of government subsidies is relatively 
lower for banks and finance companies in which the board chairman also serves as the 
CEO, suggesting that they may promote focused objectives and a clear line of command. 
However, when we examine if these differences vary according to the discretion, we 
find support for the fourth hypothesis, i.e. when high discretion exists, financial firms 
with Chairman-CEO duality have higher costs of deposit insurance.   
  For the post-crisis period, Panel B shows results different from those of the 
pre-crisis period. The results do not support the hypotheses earlier supported by the 
results for pre-crisis sample. Specifically, incentive-inducing mechanism and a 
reduction in the deviation from one-share-one-vote fail to show significant effects on 
risk. The coefficient for family group turns positive, but only marginally significant, 
implying that the presence of members of family/business group on the board may not 
be a proper measure to reduce risk exposure.   
Managerial discretion through manipulating accrual account lowers the cost of 
deposit insurance after the crisis. From the table, the coefficient of the absolute value of 
  28discretionary components of LLP is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in 
all models except the models with its interaction term. The result is in line with the 
earning management literature, which indicates that managers may manipulate accruals 
to communicate value relevant information (Healy and Palepu, 1993), or to 
communicate private information about the firm’s future prospects. Given that our 
model of non-discretionary LLP can extract the element of discretionary components, 
our result suggests that earning management through higher discretionary accruals may 
lower the risk in terms of cost of deposit insurance.   
For both periods, the results show that banks have relatively low cost of 
implicit guarantee when compared with finance firms that are highly constrained by 
legal, regulatory, and supervisory environment and thus need to engage in riskier 
activities. For instance, in model 1, the cost of deposit insurance is lower for banks, 
about 0.66 basis points lower than finance firms prior to the crisis, and becomes much 
lower for banks, around 0.91 basis points lower than finance firms after the crisis.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------ 
  Importantly, when banks and finance companies are not diversified in terms of 
revenue sources, this will cause higher risk and possibly lead to higher cost of implicit 
guarantee. Although the results are not reported, we use Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
based on loan portfolios rather than on sources of revenues and the proportion of loans 
to real estate and construction activities in the models for the second sub-period sample. 
The coefficients are positive, although insignificant.  Next, the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to net revenues is significantly and positively related with the cost, suggesting 
  29that management risk from having too much cost of operations may induce higher 
risk-associated costs. Although not reported in the text, I also regress the models 
without year dummies. The overall conclusion does not change importantly. 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper uses the cost of deposit insurance to proxy for the risk-taking 
behavior of Thai financial institutions, and examines its relationship with institutional 
fundamentals like ownership concentration and discretionary behavior of the 
management. Our findings support that the implicit deposit insurance by the 
government may create moral hazard for Thai banks and finance companies where the 
largest individual shareholders are present on the board of directors. By having not only 
control rights but also the power to control the board, they may expropriate to enjoy 
private benefits and take excessive risk due to the expectation of future rescue from the 
government. Consequently, the government has to implicitly bear high costs when the 
institutions fail or turn into trouble.   
When compared with non-family controlled institutions where are run by 
professional managers, this may be an ideal setting that helps reduce the risk of 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, sufficient consideration about managerial discretion 
of the board chairman who also serves as the chief executive officer is essential since a 
dual CEO/Chairman is prone to self-interest and private benefits of control. As accruals 
such as loan loss provisions likely result from the exercise of managerial discretion, the 
dual CEO/Chairman may have considerable latitude in manipulating earnings through a 
variety of managerial choices and in influencing and controlling the board’s decisions. 
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  33Table 1
Summary of variable definitions
Variable name Definition
Risk:
COSTDEPINS Cost of deposit insurance per unit of total liabilities using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986)
Governance variables:
CFRIGHT The percentage of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder at year t
CRIGHT The percentage of control rights held by the largest shareholder at year t
(Cash flow rights and control rights are measured as of the last book closing date in a sample 
year which varies among the firms and is not exactly at December 31)
ALIGNMENT The ratio of cash flow to control rights
FAMINBD Dummy variable which takes the value of one if the largest shareholder from family group is on the
board of directors and zero otherwise
DUALITY Dummy variable which takes the value of one if the chairman of the board also serves the chief 
executive officer or the chairman of the executive board and zero otherwise
Control variables:
FIRM SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of assets at year t
LOAN GROWTH Loan growth at year t
DBANK Dummy variable which takes the value of one for banks and zero otherwise
FOCUSREV Herfindahl Hirschman index calculated using revenues from traditional and non-traditional
activities of each financial institution
FOCUSLOAN Herfindahl Hirschman index calculated using loan portfolios of each financial institution
NONINTEXP The ratio of non-interest expenses to the sum of net interest and non-interest revenues
EQUITY RATIO The ratio of total equity to total assets at year t
ESTATELOAN Proportion of loans to real estate and construction activities
MFCLOAN Proportion of loans to manufacturing and trading activities
Discretionary and non-discretionary components:
LLP Loan loss provisions for year t/total assets at the beginning of year t
BLOAN Net loans at the begnning of year t/total assets at the beginning of year t
BALLOWANCE Allowance for doubtful account at the beginning of year t/total assets at the beginning of year t
WRITEOFF Write-offs (net of recoveries) for year t/total assets at the beginning of year t
NPWRITEOFF Write-offs (net of recoveries) for year t+1/total assets at the beginning of year t










  34Table 2
Descriptive statistics
N  Mean  Median  Std. N  Mean  Median  Std. N  Mean  Median  Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev.
LLP 223 0.021 0.005 0.041 129 0.004 0.003 0.002 94 0.045 0.029 0.054
BLOAN 223 0.768 0.800 0.114 129 0.808 0.830 0.062 94 0.712 0.747 0.143
BALLOWANCE 223 0.063 0.016 0.248 129 0.011 0.011 0.005 94 0.133 0.064 0.372
WRITEOFF 223 0.012 0.001 0.044 129 0.001 0.000 0.002 94 0.028 0.003 0.065
NPWRITEOFF 223 0.012 0.001 0.040 129 0.001 0.000 0.002 94 0.027 0.004 0.058
FAMINBD 223 0.457 0.000 0.499 129 0.628 1.000 0.485 94 0.223 0.000 0.419
DUALITY 223 0.309 0.000 0.463 129 0.318 0.000 0.467 94 0.298 0.000 0.460
FOCUSREV 223 0.776 0.786 0.119 129 0.787 0.806 0.100 94 0.762 0.770 0.141
DBANK 223 0.457 0.000 0.499 129 0.364 0.000 0.483 94 0.585 1.000 0.495
LOAN GROWTH 223 0.155 0.148 0.340 129 0.285 0.237 0.220 94 -0.023 -0.077 0.392
EQUITY RATIO 223 0.098 0.090 0.056 129 0.105 0.098 0.037 94 0.088 0.070 0.073
FIRM SIZE 223 11.080 10.914 1.453 129 10.862 10.708 1.260 94 11.378 11.367 1.643
NONINTEXP 222 1.065 0.503 0.433 128 0.476 0.441 0.146 94 1.866 0.856 0.659
ESTATELOAN 94 0.187 0.172 0.108 94 0.187 0.172 0.108
MFCLOAN 94 0.427 0.467 0.150 94 0.427 0.467 0.150
FOCUSLOAN 94 0.332 0.317 0.068 94 0.332 0.317 0.068
(1994-1996) (1998-2001)
This table provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis for each sample period. The sample consists of banks and
finance companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) for the whole period and two sub-periods of 1994-1996 and 1998-
2001.
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Cost of deposit insurance
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Panel A: Cost of Deposit Insurance
Bank  0.0119  0.0033  0.0082  0.0078  1.6135  0.2986  0.0387  0.0200  0.4927
(0.0024) (0.0006) (0.0052) (0.0020) (1.1976) (0.2357) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0702)
[16] [16] [15] [47] [9] [9] [9] [9] [36]
Finance  0.0590  0.0586  0.0429  0.0530  3.9219  3.2141  0.6390  0.2704  2.1470
(0.0470) (0.0427) (0.0340) (0.0366) (3.4901) (1.9447) (0.4748) (0.1626) (1.2846)
[31] [33] [37] [101] [12] [10] [10] [9] [41]
Whole  0.0430  0.0406  0.0329  0.0386  2.9326  1.8331  0.3546  0.1452  1.3736
(0.0256) (0.0249) (0.0206) (0.0232) (2.0778) (1.0931) (0.1639) (0.0602) (0.3958)
[47] [49] [52] [148] [21] [19] [19] [18] [77]
Panel B: Cost of Deposit Insurance for problem institutions
Bank  0.0211  0.0052  0.0134  0.0132
(0.0067) (0.0015) (0.0076) (0.0032)
[7] [7] [6] [20]
Finance  0.0703  0.0689  0.0488  0.0620
(0.0539) (0.0664) (0.0350) (0.0445)
[21] [23] [25] [69]
Whole  0.0580  0.0540  0.0420  0.0511
(0.0383) (0.0422) (0.0328) (0.0340)
[28] [30] [31] [89]
Panel C: Cost of Deposit Insurance for sustainable institutions
Bank  0.0048  0.0019  0.0048  0.0038  1.6135  0.2986  0.0387  0.0200  0.4927
(0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0052) (0.0008) (1.1976) (0.2357) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0702)
[9] [9] [9] [27] [9] [9] [9] [9] [36]
Finance  0.0352  0.0351  0.0305  0.0334  3.9219  3.2141  0.6390  0.2704  2.1470
(0.0229) (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0245) (3.4901) (1.9447) (0.4748) (0.1626) (1.2846)
[10] [10] [12] [32] [12] [10] [10] [9] [41]
Whole  0.0208  0.0194  0.0195  0.0199  2.9326  1.8331  0.3546  0.1452  1.3736
(0.0095) (0.0035) (0.0103) (0.0073) (2.0778) (1.0931) (0.1639) (0.0602) (0.3958)
[19] [19] [21] [59] [21] [19] [19] [18] [77]
This table reports the implicit costs of deposit insurance in percentage estimated using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986)
classified by types of financial institutions - banks or finance companies. Panel A summarizes the cost of deposit insurance for
banks and finance firms without being classified as problem institutions. Panels B and C report the value for problem and
sustainable institutions respectively. Problem financial institutions are banks and finance companies that were closed down or
intervened by the government during 1997-1998. The institutions that were not closed down or intervened by the government are
considered as sustainable financial institutions. The median values of deposit insurance and the number of institutions are reported
in parentheses and square brackets below mean values respectively.
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Summary of selected components used in/derived from the estimation of the implicit cost of deposit insurance
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Panel A: Estimated market value of assets
Banks  269,330  321,807  352,991  313,895  555,695  566,897  549,996  558,217  557,701
(165,606) (202,761) (232,761) (191,146) (464,353) (451,518) (429,237) (437,705) (444,612)
Finance  33,144  40,051  36,848  36,758  26,668  25,028  23,462  30,695  26,370
(20,180) (28,360) (25,387) (24,210) (16,744) (14,287) (19,323) (19,425) (19,128)
Whole  113,547  132,053  128,043  124,767  253,394  281,703  272,873  294,456  274,785
(44,544) (45,608) (42,719) (43,834) (53,275) (67,632) (76,479) (99,050) (67,632)
Panel B: Book value of assets
Banks  240,486  289,387  339,289  288,666  519,041  535,283  545,628  554,225  538,017
(161,144) (192,638) (234,206) (183,874) (419,449) (446,532) (435,112) (443,566) (443,566)
Finance  26,549  32,976  35,943  32,090  27,240  23,418  25,891  32,149  27,056
(17,862) (21,116) (24,559) (21,705) (17,302) (12,463) (20,745) (28,334) (19,552)
Whole  99,379  116,702  123,446  113,570  250,786  265,880  272,082  293,187  269,435
(37,143) (43,584) (42,996) (41,340) (60,885) (64,318) (85,444) (98,699) (69,174)
Panel C: Bank debts/Market value of assets
Banks  0.836  0.845  0.882  0.854  0.938  0.874  0.935  0.943  0.923
(0.826) (0.854) (0.884) (0.857) (0.948) (0.890) (0.965) (0.957) (0.945)
Finance  0.740  0.765  0.889  0.803  0.945  0.806  0.863  0.840  0.868
(0.758) (0.780) (0.900) (0.821) (0.958) (0.802) (0.857) (0.846) (0.877)
Whole  0.773  0.792  0.887  0.819  0.942  0.838  0.897  0.891  0.894
(0.800) (0.809) (0.891) (0.838) (0.948) (0.869) (0.910) (0.906) (0.915)
Panel D: Estimated asset return volatility
Bank  0.062  0.049  0.040  0.051  0.099  0.089  0.034  0.028  0.063
(0.064) (0.043) (0.037) (0.047) (0.083) (0.069) (0.018) (0.021) (0.043)
Finance  0.125  0.111  0.052  0.094  0.151  0.251  0.116  0.109  0.157
(0.115) (0.104) (0.043) (0.087) (0.119) (0.261) (0.117) (0.091) (0.130)
Whole  0.104  0.091  0.049  0.080  0.129  0.174  0.077  0.068  0.113
(0.089) (0.082) (0.042) (0.067) (0.092) (0.149) (0.062) (0.047) (0.083)
Panel E: Estimated equity return volatility
Bank  0.379  0.320  0.369  0.356  0.995  0.654  0.492  0.495  0.659
(0.353) (0.314) (0.383) (0.352) (0.992) (0.660) (0.482) (0.481) (0.558)
Finance  0.480  0.473  0.471  0.475  1.145  0.967  0.737  0.635  0.890
(0.487) (0.480) (0.466) (0.476) (1.170) (0.966) (0.700) (0.628) (0.826)
Whole  0.446  0.423  0.441  0.437  1.081  0.819  0.621  0.565  0.782
(0.440) (0.443) (0.453) (0.444) (1.082) (0.795) (0.649) (0.569) (0.711)
This table presents the mean and median values of the market value of assets and annualized standard deviation of asset returns
estimated using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986), the book value of assets, the ratio of total bank debts to the market value of
assets, and annualized standard deviation of equity return over the period of 1994-1996 and 1998-2001. The market value and book
value of assets are expressed in millions of Baht.
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Distribution of financial institutions
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
F a m i l y N 3 23 44 01 0 67 4 4 3 1 8
% (64.00) (66.67) (70.18) (67.09) (26.92) (17.39) (18.18) (15.79) (20.00)
C P B N 5651 643331 3
% (10.00) (11.76) (8.77) (10.13) (15.38) (13.04) (13.64) (15.79) (14.44)
G o v e r n m e n t N 1 0 892 798863 1
% (20.00) (15.69) (15.79) (17.09) (34.62) (34.78) (36.36) (31.58) (34.44)
Foreign investors N 3 3 3 9 6 8 7 7 28
% (6.00) (5.88) (5.26) (5.70) (23.08) (34.78) (31.82) (36.84) (31.11)
Total N 50 51 57 158 26 23 22 19 90
% (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
This table provides the distribution of Thai financial institutions by types of the largest shareholders over 1994-1996 and
1998-2001. Shareholders are classified into four groups that include family, a specially organized investment company of the
royal family (CPB), the government, and foreign investors according to the level of control rights. The % rows show the
percentage of financial institutions for each type of shareholders divided by total number of institutions in the year.
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Control and cash flow rights
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Family Mean 28.93 28.88 26.91 28.15 35.73 38.88 24.12 34.73 33.68
a
Median 29.02 28.47 26.79 28.07 36.53 45.51 27.82 37.45 36.62
CPB Mean 22.72 26.24 26.08 25.09 30.21 32.94 23.76 30.11 29.33
Median 17.39 26.59 32.61 26.04 34.08 31.80 23.25 20.81 31.80
Government Mean 37.41 38.00 34.37 36.57 77.49 77.29 74.72 70.01 75.27***
Median 29.65 32.29 34.04 30.62 79.52 95.81 91.77 83.39 91.77***
Foreign investors Mean 30.54 33.20 33.85 32.53 34.86 56.35 65.42 64.15 55.96**
Median 34.97 34.97 34.97 34.97 33.13 63.39 75.00 75.00 51.75**
Total Mean 30.10 30.26 28.38 29.53 49.14 57.54 55.61 55.98 54.31***
Median 29.26 30.18 29.04 29.44 40.03 51.78 46.17 49.50 49.11***
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Family Mean 22.50 21.58 20.31 21.38 28.46 30.58 17.71 28.42 26.54
a
Median 19.76 19.45 18.89 19.44 30.75 38.73 19.35 28.00 28.86
a
CPB Mean 16.25 18.50 19.00 17.95 22.70 23.10 19.07 16.57 20.54
Median 10.34 19.92 21.95 16.29 28.90 22.42 20.92 17.54 20.92
Government Mean 27.96 30.87 25.70 28.07 73.95 76.78 74.22 69.92 73.97***
Median 19.13 31.24 17.93 28.42 73.55 93.94 89.98 83.39 91.77***
Foreign investors Mean 30.54 33.20 33.36 32.37 34.72 56.24 65.42 64.15 55.90**
Median 34.97 34.97 34.97 34.97 33.13 63.39 75.00 75.00 51.75**
Total Mean 23.45 23.36 21.73 22.80 44.77 54.60 53.62 52.82 51.14***
Median 19.76 20.92 19.33 19.96 37.23 42.84 46.17 49.50 42.84***
1994 1995 1996 All 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
Family Mean 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.81 0.77
Median 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.66 0.72 0.75
CPB Mean 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.81 0.69 0.71
Median 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.76 0.71 0.90 0.84 0.79
Government Mean 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98***
Median 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00***
Foreign investors Mean 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.97
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total Mean 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.90***
Median 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00***
***, **, and 
a denote significance at the 1, 5, and 15 percent levels respectively.
Panel B: Cash flow rights
Panel C: The ratio of cash flow to control rights
This table reports summary of control and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder classified by types of shareholders over
1994-1996 and 1998-2001. Panels A, B and C present control rights, cash flow rights, and the ratio of cash flow rights to control
rights respectively. Control right is the aggregation of direct ownership and indirect ownership which is the sum of the weakest
links in the chain of voting rights. Cash flow right is the aggregation of direct ownership and the sum of the products of all
ownership stakes along the chain of control. Both control and cash flow rights are calculated following Claessens et al. (2000).
Mean and median differences are tested using t-test and Wilcoxin rank-sum test respectively.
Panel A: Control rights
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period
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Loan loss provisions
Variable t -statistic t -statistic
Intercept -0.003 -1.029 -0.050* -1.909
BLOAN 0.007** 2.097 0.118*** 3.270
BALLOWANCE 0.027 0.680 -0.012 -0.860
WRITEOFF 0.160 1.302 0.221*** 2.803
NPWRITEOFF 0.431*** 4.633 0.220** 2.495
Adj. R-squared 0.2224 0.2253
N 129 94





a) First sub-period (1994-1996) b) Second sub-period (1998-2001)
This table reports estimation results for each sample from regressing loan loss provision (LLP) on begining-of-the-year net
loans (BLOAN), beginning-of-the-year allowance for doubtful account (BALLOWANCE), net write-offs during year t
(WRITEOFF), and ex-post write-offs at year t+1(NPWRITEOFF), and for discretionary portion of LLP. All variables are
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Deposit insurance, ownership concentration, and discretionary behavior
Panel A: First sub-period  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept 0.618 0.195 0.572 0.813 0.707 0.950
(0.576) (0.182) (0.546) (0.731) (0.654) (0.897)
CFRIGHT -0.010** -0.017*** -0.016***
(-2.617) (-3.353) (-3.281)
FAMINBD -0.075 -0.465** -0.447** -0.054 -1.005*** -0.883**
(-0.566) (-2.029) (-2.020) (-0.402) (-2.793) (-2.494)
CFRIGHT*FAMINBD 0.017** 0.015* 0.000
(2.075) (1.856) (0.000)




DUALITY -0.209 -0.250* -0.691*** -0.252* -0.285** -0.668***
(-1.621) (-1.948) (-3.616) (-1.955) (-2.271) (-3.479)
ABSDISCRETE -0.057 -0.214 -0.971** -0.085 -0.157 -0.819*
(-0.132) (-0.497) (-2.000) (-0.196) (-0.370) (-1.686)
DUALITY*ABSDISCRETE 2.783*** 2.418**
(3.033) (2.590)
Loan Growth 0.196 0.144 0.081 0.185 0.068 0.029
(0.756) (0.559) (0.325) (0.703) (0.264) (0.114)
Firm Size -0.059 -0.015 -0.042 -0.076 -0.024 -0.049
(-0.763) (-0.188) (-0.553) (-0.969) (-0.303) (-0.627)
FOCUSREV 1.524** 1.797** 1.929*** 1.588** 1.766** 1.889***
(2.110) (2.480) (2.751) (2.179) (2.485) (2.718)
DBANK -1.078*** -1.131*** -1.000*** -0.968*** -1.101*** -0.984***
(-5.152) (-5.440) (-4.870) (-4.360) (-4.990) (-4.474)
NONINTEXP 2.036*** 2.061*** 1.909*** 2.217*** 2.042*** 1.926***
(4.303) (4.415) (4.207) (4.569) (4.297) (4.134)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.5341 0.5470 0.5772 0.5248 0.5520 0.5732
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
This table presents regression coefficients of the effects of ownership concentration, bank focus, and discretionary behavior on
the implicit cost of deposit insurance for two sub-periods of 1994-1996 and 1998-2001 in Panels A and B respectively. The
dependent variable for each regression is ln(1+COSTDEPINS) where COSTDEPINS is the implicit cost of deposit insurance in
basis points based on the method of Ronn and Verma (1986). CFRIGHT is the percentage of cash flow rights of the largest
shareholder. FAMINBD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there exists the largest shareholder from family group on the board of
directors and zero otherwise. ALIGNMENT is the ratio of cash flow to control rights. Loan Growth is the growth rate of net
loans from previous year. Firm Size is natural logarithm of total assets. FOCUSREV is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated
and non-interest revenues. ABSDISCRETE is the absolute value of residual (DISCRETION) from LLP equation. DUALITY is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a chairman of the board of directors also serves as the chief executive officer or the chairman of the
executive board. DBANK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a sample firm is a bank and zero otherwise. NONINTEXP is the
ratio of non-interest expenses to total revenues. The values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote








  41Table 8 (continued)
Deposit insurance, ownership concentration, and discretionary behavior
Panel B: Second sub-period [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept -1.495 -1.472 -1.554 -1.227 -0.905 -1.252
(-0.779) (-0.759) (-0.755) (-0.663) (-0.436) (-0.609)
CFRIGHT 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.631) (0.543) (0.677)
FAMINBD 0.659* 0.467 0.655** 0.632* -0.287 0.625*
(1.898) (0.569) (2.062) (1.827) (-0.221) (1.978)
CFRIGHT*FAMINBD 0.007
(0.272)




DUALITY 0.359 0.334 0.641 0.370 0.333 0.638
(1.132) (1.103) (1.280) (1.171) (1.073) (1.268)
ABSDISCRETE -0.115* -0.118* -0.084 -0.113* -0.106* -0.082
(-1.880) (-1.872) (-0.936) (-1.841) (-1.676) (-0.917)
DUALITY*ABSDISCRETE -0.133 -0.126
(-0.714) (-0.676)
Loan Growth -0.671 -0.681 -0.607 -0.631 -0.687 -0.570
(-1.198) (-1.206) (-0.809) (-1.147) (-1.229) (-0.758)
Firm Size 0.005 0.006 0.010 -0.023 -0.040 -0.020
(0.031) (0.036) (0.061) (-0.162) (-0.257) (-0.120)
FOCUSREV 7.603*** 7.589*** 7.498*** 7.624*** 7.602*** 7.524***
(7.305) (7.216) (6.759) (7.501) (7.411) (6.740)
DBANK -2.463*** -2.439*** -2.464*** -2.375*** -2.294*** -2.368***
(-4.857) (-4.695) (-4.104) (-5.121) (-4.571) (-4.034)
NONINTEXP 0.060** 0.060** 0.058 0.060** 0.056** 0.058
(2.156) (2.147) (1.502) (2.218) (2.012) (1.463)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.6082 0.6026 0.6052 0.6060 0.6030 0.6027










































Net Loans/Total Assets (left scale)
Allowance for doubtful accounts/Net Loans (left scale)
Loan Loss Provisions/Net Loans (right scale)
Write-offs/Net Loans (right scale)
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